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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Severely brain damaged patients represent major ethical and legal 
challenges in end-of-life care. In particular, the vegetative state has featured 
significantly in the origins and evolution of the “right to die” movement. The 
first significant end-of-life case was Quinlan, where the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, citing Quinlan’s constitutional right to privacy, permitted her father to 
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withdraw her ventilator. 1 The right to die movement reached its apex in 
1990, when in Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court assumed (without 
deciding) that an incompetent person had a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing life-prolonging treatment.2 The politically contentious 
Schiavo case engendered a national discussion about the appropriateness of 
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration at the end of life.3 These three 
seminal cases featured young women in a “persistent” vegetative state and 
defined the boundaries of the right to withhold or withdraw treatment from 
those with severely impaired consciousness.  
The Quinlan case, in particular, marked a turning point, as it allowed 
physicians, courts, legislatures, and the public to view the vegetative state as 
a meaningless, bleak existence of irreversible unconsciousness, justifying the 
decision to forego life-sustaining treatment.  Recently, however, 
sophisticated neuroimaging studies have challenged the decades-old 
assumption that all vegetative patients lack capacity for conscious thought. 
The evolving science has promise to transform the evaluation and treatment 
of patients in a vegetative state and its related disorder of consciousness—the 
minimally conscious state. 
 
II.  DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Disorders of consciousness arise from severe brain injury most 
commonly caused by massive head trauma or a nontramautic event such as a 
cardiac arrest that results in an anoxic injury to the brain.4 Consciousness has 
two main components: the level of consciousness, which includes 
wakefulness or arousal, and the content of consciousness, which is 
awareness.5 Awareness can be divided into awareness of self and awareness 
of the environment.6 After a serious brain insult, one or both of these 
components may be compromised, leading to a disorder of consciousness. 
Severe disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state, and the 
minimally conscious state.    
 
 
                                                 
 1  In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. 
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
 2  Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1990).  
 3  See, e.g., Terry Schiavo’s life, death sparked national debate, CNN U.S. News, 
March 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/31/obit.schiavo/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2013); see also Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004) (holding that statute 
authorizing governor to issue a stay of the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a 
vegetative patient was unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine). 
 4  JAMES L BERNAT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 288, 295 (3d ed. 2008). 
 5  Steve Majerus et al., Behavioral Evaluation of Consciousness in Severe Brain 
Damage, 150 PROG. BRAIN RES. 397, 397 (2005), available at http://espra.risc.cnrs.fr 
/majerus_PBR_vol150_397_413.pdf. 
 6  Id.  
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A. Coma 
 
Coma is a state of unwakefulness (eyes-closed) and unawareness.7 
Patients in a coma are unable to be aroused with stimuli.8 It is usually a 
temporary, acute state that can last days to weeks.9 Patients may devolve 
from coma to brain death, which is defined as the irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the brain,10 or may fully recover to a conscious state. In other 
cases, recovery may not advance beyond a severe disability with little or no 
consciousness. 
 
B. Vegetative State 
 
What Patients may emerge from coma into a condition of 
“wakefulness without awareness,” or the vegetative state (VS).11  Patients in 
a VS, unlike those who are brain dead, have preserved or partially preserved 
hypothalamic and brain stem functions necessary for survival.12 They open 
their eyes and often breathe on their own but, due to loss of cortical or higher 
brain function, are incapable of purposeful, voluntary, reproducible 
movement in response to stimuli.13 When stimuli-induced, vegetative 
patients exhibit only reflex or automatic movements, such as posturing in 
response to pain or eye-opening when subjected to a loud noise.14 Many 
individuals in this condition live for an extended period of time as long as 
they receive sustenance; they are not terminally ill.15 
The term persistent vegetative state was coined in 1972 by Jennett 
and Plum to describe patients whose “vegetative, mindless state” lasted 
longer than a few weeks.16 In 1994, the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 
defined the temporal boundaries of the vegetative state.17 The persistent 
vegetative state was deemed permanent if it lasted more than three months 
                                                 
 7  Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related 
Disorders, 3 LANCET NEUROLOGY, 537, 538 (2004). 
 8  Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15, 
15 (2010). 
 9  Id. 
 10  UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 781 (2008).  
 11  Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A 
Syndrome in Search of a Name, 1 LANCET 734, 734 (1972). 
 12  The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent 
Vegetative State (1), 330 N. ENG. J. MED 1499, 1500 (1994). 
 13  Id.  
 14  Joseph J. Fins et al., Neuroimaging and Disorders of Consciousness: 
Envisioning an Ethical Research Agenda, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 4 (2008). 
 15  American Academy of Neurology, Position of the American Academy of 
Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State 
Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125 (1989). 
 16  Jennett & Plum, supra note 11, at 736. 
 17  The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent 
Vegetative State (2), 330 N. ENG. J. MED 1572, 1575 (1994). 
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for those patients with nontraumatic brain injury and more than twelve 
months for those with traumatic brain injury.18 The Task Force concluded 
that recovery after these times was rare and almost always involved moderate 
to severe disability.19 
There has been criticism of the semantics surrounding the vegetative 
state. Some clinicians object to the term “vegetative”20 because in the minds 
of many lay people (and some professionals), it implies the patient is a 
“vegetable” and therefore, subhuman.21  For that reason, the European Task 
Force on Disorders of Consciousness recently recommended that the term 
vegetative state be changed to “unresponsive wakefulness syndrome” 
(UWS).22  Further, PVS, an abbreviation for persistent vegetative state, is 
often confused as the acronym for permanent vegetative state, leading some 
groups and authors to avoid the terms persistent or permanent when referring 
to the vegetative state.23 Finally, many clinicians use the terms persistent and 
permanent interchangeably.24 However, persistent is a diagnosis of a 
disability of uncertain duration, while permanent is a prognosis and implies 
irreversibility.25 For these reasons, many neurologists simply describe the 
syndrome as the vegetative state or VS, a term that will be used in this 
article. 
There is also some confusion in legal and medical circles as to the 
implications of a VS diagnosis. Although by definition, VS patients are 
unaware and lack the ability to perceive pain,26 some courts have allowed 
juries to award damages to VS patients for conscious pain and suffering.27 
                                                 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  The term vegetative was chosen as it refers to the preserved vegetative 
functions of patients, including sleep-wake cycles, respiration, digestion, and 
thermoregulation. Marie-Aurélie Bruno et al., From Unresponsive Wakefulness to Minimally 
Conscious PLUS and Functional Locked-In Syndromes: Recent Advances in Our 
Understanding of Disorders of Consciousness, 258 J. NEUROLOGY 1373, 1373–74 (2011). 
 21  Id. at 1374 (noting tendency of laypersons to use the word “vegetable” to refer 
to those with severe disorders of consciousness); see also BERNAT, supra note 4 at 288 
(opining that “the term ‘vegetative’ was an unfortunate choice because of its unintended 
similarity to the pejorative term ‘vegetable’ . . . .”). 
 22  Steven Laureys et al., Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A New Name for 
the Vegetative State or Apallic Syndrome, 8 BMC MEDICINE 68, 69 (2010), available at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7015-8-68.pdf. 
 23  See Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: What’s in a Name?, 28 
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 4 (2011) (preferring to avoid use of the terms persistent of 
permanent); see also BERNAT, supra note 4 at  289 (stating that it is best to avoid the modifier 
persistent or permanent when referring to the vegetative state). 
 24  BERNAT, supra note 4 at 288. 
 25  The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 12 at 1501. 
 26  See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 15 at 125 (stating that VS 
patients cannot experience pain). 
 27  See, e.g., Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004) 
(allowing the jury to award damages for conscious pain and suffering of a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state based on a nurse’s testimony that the patient was able to respond to 
his environment); Maracle v. Curcio, 806 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840–841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
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Other courts have referred to vegetative patients as comatose,28 or terminally 
ill29 (although most are not). And it is not unusual for misunderstandings to 
exist about the difference between the VS and brain death,30 even among 
neurologists.31 Although the nomenclature in this area is confused, the 
essence of the permanent VS is thought to be state of total 
unconsciousness—of nothingness—from which no return is possible.  
 
C. Minimally Conscious State 
 
Patients may emerge from coma or may transition from the VS to a 
state of partial awareness, known as the minimally conscious state (MCS).32 
The condition of partial consciousness has been observed for years, but the 
diagnostic criteria for MCS were developed only a decade ago by the Aspen 
Neurobehavioral Conference.33 The MCS is defined as a syndrome in which 
the person has intermittent but reproducible evidence of discernible 
awareness of self or the environment.34 Behaviors exhibited by patients in 
MCS include following simple commands, gesturing or verbalizing yes or no 
to questions, manipulating objects, purposeful blinking or smiling (not 
reflexive), or intelligible verbalization.35 MCS may also be categorized by 
the level of behavioral responses: MCS+ describes higher functioning 
patients, while MCS- refers to minimal or low-level responses.36  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
(affirming trial court’s refusal to dismiss claim for conscious pain and suffering because the 
patient, “although in a vegetative state, had the requisite level of awareness necessary for such 
an award”). 
 28  See, e.g., People v. Haley, 960 N.E.2d 670, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing 
evidence that if the patient had survived, he would have been in a “comatose vegetative 
state”); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D. R.I. 1988) (describing a persistent 
vegetative state patient as being in “a type of comatose state”). 
 29  See, e.g., In re AB, 768 N.Y.S.2d 256, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (referring to 
infant in a persistent vegetative state as terminally ill). 
 30  See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense Of the 
Special Law Enacted By Congress and President Bush, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 151, 154 (2006) 
(criticizing the failure of the courts in the Schiavo case to order brain scans because “there was 
no hard evidence that Mrs. Schiavo was truly brain-dead at the time that tube was removed.”). 
 31  See Ari R. Joffe et al., A Survey of American Neurologists About Brain Death: 
Understanding the Conceptual Basis and Diagnostic Tests for Brain Death, 2 ANNALS OF 
INTENSIVE CARE 1, 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.annalsofintensivecare.com/content/pdf/2110-5820-2-4.pdf (reporting that almost 
half of neurologists surveyed understood brain death as the loss of higher brain functions or 
permanent loss of consciousness). 
 32  J.T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State Definition and Diagnostic 
Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY 349, 349–351 (2002), available at 
http://www.neurology.org/content/58/3/349.full. 
 33  Id. at 350. 
 34  Id. at 351. 
 35  Id.  
 36  Bruno, supra note 20, at 1373. 
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D. Locked-in Syndrome 
  
Locked-in syndrome (LIS) is not a disorder of consciousness, but 
may appear as one.37  A person with LIS has preserved consciousness 
without the ability to move or communicate, except, in most cases, by 
voluntary vertical eye movements and blinking.38 The locked-in syndrome 
was brought to the public’s attention in Jean-Dominique Bauby’s 
autobiographical work, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly.39  Bauby, who was 
in LIS and fully conscious, wrote the book one letter at a time by blinking his 
left eye.40  
 The classical locked-in state is characterized by total immobility 
that prevents movement or speech, preserved cognitive functioning, and a 
code for communicating that uses eye movements or blinking.41 In some 
patients, the syndrome is considered incomplete because the patient has some 
remnants of voluntary motion.42 Total LIS occurs in the presence of complete 
immobility, including eye movements.43 
 
E. Diagnostic Challenges 
 
Differentiating between these three syndromes is very challenging, 
particularly in those patients who have limited or inconsistent motor ability 
from which consciousness may be inferred.44 Studies performed during the 
past two decades confirm that standard clinical diagnosis of the vegetative 
state may be erroneous in more than forty percent of patients.45 The high rate 
                                                 
 37  See Caroline Schnakers et al., Detecting Consciousness In a Total Locked-In 
Syndrome: An Active Event-Related Paradigm, 15 NEUROCASE 271, 272 (2009) (noting that 
difficulties in diagnosis of LIS occur because of behavioral similarities to VS). 
 38  Nick Chisholm & Grant Gillett, The Patient’s Journey: Living With Locked-In 
Syndrome, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 94, 95–96 (2005). 
 39  JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY, THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY: A MEMOIR 
OF LIFE IN DEATH (Jeremy Leggatt trans., Vintage International 1997). 
 40  Steven Laureys et al., The Locked-In Syndrome: What Is It Like To Be 
Conscious But Paralyzed and Voiceless?, in 150 PROG. BRAIN RES. 495, 497 (Steven Laureys 
ed., 2005), available at http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/papers/ LIS/2005_PBR 
_vol150_495_511.pdf. 
 41  Id.at 497. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Steven Laureys et al., supra note 7, at 537. 
 45  See Caroline Schnakers et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and 
Minimally Conscious State: Clinical Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioral 
Assessment, 9 BMC NEUROLOGY 35 (2009), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2377/9/35 (finding forty-one percent of VS patients to be in MCS); Keith Andrews et al., 
Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit, 313 BRIT. 
MED. J. 13, 14 (1996) (concluding that forty-three percent of patients in VS were 
misdiagnosed); Nancy L. Childs et al., Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State, 
43 NEUROLOGY 1465, 1466 (1993) (reporting that thirty-seven percent of those labeled in VS 
had some level of awareness); Donald D. Tresch et al., Clinical Characteristics of Patients in 
6
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of diagnostic errors has persisted despite improved behavioral testing 
standards.46  In most of these cases, patients are found to be in MCS rather 
than VS, but some misdiagnosed patients are in LIS.47   
“Consciousness is at the heart of the distinction” between the 
vegetative, minimally conscious, and locked-in, states.48 There is, however, 
no objective test for measuring consciousness.49 Diagnostic errors occur 
because the examiner can only infer the lack of awareness in a person by 
observation of the person’s behavior and the ability to signal consciousness 
through motor or verbal responses.50 Distinguishing VS from MCS depends 
on “meaningful” or “purposeful” responses to commands or stimuli, terms 
that require subjective interpretation on the part of the examiner.51 There are 
multiple bedside assessment tools used for diagnosing the level of 
consciousness, some of which are less reliable than others.52  
Patients with disorders of consciousness may confuse examiners 
because of temporal conditions such as sedative medication.53 Many of the 
misdiagnosed may be blind or severely visually impaired, making it difficult 
to assess purposeful eye tracking.54 Others may be deaf or hearing-impaired, 
confounding verbal command testing.55 Finally, the examiner’s and treatment 
team’s experience, skill, and length of assessment affect their ability to draw 
accurate conclusions from the patient’s behavior.56  
                                                                                                                   
the Persistent Vegetative State, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 930, 930 (1991) (concluding 
that eighteen percent of those diagnosed in the persistent vegetative state were aware of 
themselves or their environment). 
 46  See Gosseries, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that despite the publication of 
diagnostic criteria for VS and MCS, the high rate of diagnostic error has not changed). 
 47  See Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499–500 (describing two poignant cases 
where LIS patients were mistakenly diagnosed in the vegetative state). 
 48  Martha Farah, That Little Matter of Consciousness, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17, 17 
(2009). 
 49  Majerus, supra note 5, at 397. Further, there is a debate in neurology about the 
nature of consciousness itself. See Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum, Diagnosing 
Consciousness, Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 374, 
375 (2010) (explaining that although there are established criteria for impaired consciousness, 
there is little agreement on what defines consciousness). 
 50  Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 12, at 1501; see also Majerus, 
supra note 5, at 398 (“Clinically, we are limited to the appraisal of the patient’s capacity to 
perceive the external world and to voluntarily interact with it (i.e., perceptual awareness.)”); 
Martin M. Monti et al., Neuroimaging and the Vegetative State Resolving the Behavioral 
Assessment Dilemma?, 1157 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81, 83 (2009) (stating that the 
differentiation between consciousness and unconsciousness is the ability of the patient to 
signal awareness). 
 51  Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 399. 
 52  See generally id. at 402–11 (describing a number of tests used to assess 
consciousness). 
 53  Monti et al., supra note 50, at 85 (noting that diagnostic errors can occur due to 
the failure to exclude such factors as sedatives, range of motion, posture, and nutrition). 
 54 Id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 401–02. 
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In patients who have complete LIS and who are immobile (except 
perhaps for blinking and eye movements) and unable to speak, preservation 
of consciousness is often difficult to detect at the bedside.57 Discerning 
purposeful eye blinking from spontaneous or reflex eye blinking requires 
repeated observation under different conditions.58 In patients with total LIS 
without eye movements, rates of misdiagnosis may be particularly high.59 
Without careful surveillance, locked-in patients may be mistakenly 
considered to be in a vegetative or minimally conscious state.60  
Further, once labeled with the term vegetative, it is frequently 
difficult to change the diagnosis as caretakers may not notice subtle changes 
in the level of consciousness.61 One well-publicized case demonstrates the 
tenacity of the VS label. Nineteen years after a traumatic brain injury, Terry 
Wallis began to speak.62 During those years, Wallis was described as being 
in a VS.63 A subsequent review of his medical records showed that he had 
emerged from VS to MCS.64 Interestingly, scientists later discovered axonal 
regrowth in Wallis’ brain, indicating that such regrowth may play a role in 
late recovery of function in patients with severe brain injuries.65 
 
F. Prognosis 
 
Studies have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between 
these three states because of the differing potential for patient improvement. 
While unresponsive patients in the VS have been thought to have little to no 
chance of recovery after one year, there are no such temporal boundaries for 
improvement or recovery for those in MCS.66 Patients with MCS have 
significantly more favorable outcomes than patients in the VS, particularly 
those with traumatic brain injuries.67 Although many MCS patients will 
                                                 
 57  Chisolm & Gillett, supra note 38, at 95–96; see also Laureys, supra note 40, at 
499 (noting that in a majority of cases, it is a relative of the LIS patient and not the physician 
who first realizes the patient is conscious and able to communicate through eye movements). 
 58  Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 400. 
 59  Schnakers et al. supra note 37, at 272. 
 60  Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499. 
 61  Bruno et al., supra note 20, at 1374.  
 62  Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, and Disorders of Consciousness: 
Promise or Peril?, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 336, 341 
(2010).  
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Giancino et al., supra note 32, at 352 (declaring that it is not known how many 
patients will emerge from MCS more than one year post-injury). 
 67  Id.; see also Dominic Wilkinson & Julian Savulescu, Is It Better To Be 
Minimally Conscious Than Vegetative?, J. MED. ETHICS (2012), available at 
http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2012/08/31/medethics-2012-100954.short  (citing studies 
showing that half of MCS patients developed signs of functional recovery by 12 months and 
that one-third of patients who had been in MCS more than one year showed continued 
improvement over the next five years). 
8
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remain in MCS with severe disabilities, others may progress to a state where 
they can functionally communicate.68   
The prognosis of patients with LIS varies with the extent of the brain 
lesion.69 Some patients with locked-in syndrome may exhibit good functional 
outcomes, including limited motor recovery, with the benefit of 
rehabilitation.70 In these LIS patients, a misdiagnosis of VS or MCS can be 
particularly harmful, delaying or depriving conscious individuals of adequate 
therapeutic measures designed to provide a useful recovery and improved 
quality of life.71 
 
G. Pain Perception 
 
The importance of distinguishing between these disorders also 
relates to patients’ perception of pain. Pain is thought to be a phenomenon of 
the conscious state.72 LIS patients are conscious and can experience pain. 
Those patients in a VS or MCS pose a challenge for clinicians determining 
the patient’s level of pain perception solely through behavior assessments.73 
Patients in a VS are thought to be unable to perceive pain and are not 
routinely administered potent analgesics, even when end-of-life care is 
withdrawn.74 There are no guidelines for the treatment of pain in MCS 
patients,75although there have been recommendations to treat all MCS 
patients with analgesics since they have, by definition, some evidence of the 
ability to be conscious of pain.76  
 
 
 
                                                 
 68  Laureys, supra note 7, at 539. 
 69  José León-Carrión et al., The Locked-In Syndrome: A Syndrome Looking for a 
Therapy, 16 BRAIN INJURY 571, 579 (2002) (stating that LIS caused by traumatic damages to 
the brain stem may be transient and portend a better prognosis than LIS that is secondary to an 
occlusion of the basilar artery). 
 70  Id. at 578.   
 71  Id. at 575; see also Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499 (reporting average 
delays in diagnosis of LIS patients of seventy-eight days; several patients were not correctly 
diagnosed for more than four years). 
 72  See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 15, at 125 (stating that VS 
patients lack the capacity to experience pain and suffering); see also Nada Gligorov, 
Unconscious Pain, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 27, 27 (2008) (describing the standard view that “pain 
(is) an exclusively conscious state . . . .”).  
 73  See Mélanie Boly et al., Perception of Pain In the Minimally Conscious State 
With PET Activation: An Observational Study, 7 LANCET NEUROLOGY 1013, 1013 (2008), 
available at  
http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/papers/vs/Pain_MCS_LancetNeuro08.pdf. 
 74  See Fins, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that pain treatment is not generally used in 
VS patients, and that Schiavo died without receiving strong opiates). 
 75  Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1013. 
 76 Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1018 (“[T]he results of the study should prompt 
the use of analgesics in patients in MCS . . . .”). 
9
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III.  RECENT ADVANCES IN NEUROIMAGING 
  
Neuroimaging holds promise as an aid in diagnosing disorders of 
consciousness, principally in those who are unable to produce any 
meaningful behavioral response.77 In particular, positron emission 
tomography (PET),78 and, more recently, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI),79 have been used in an attempt to assess the level of 
cognition of patients with serious brain disorders and to distinguish the VS 
from the MCS. Functional neuroimaging is distinguished from structural 
imaging, such as computer tomography (CT) or traditional MRI scans, which 
produce only pictures of the brain.80  Functional brain scans measure the 
brain’s activity both at rest and in response to commands.81   
Using electrophysiology, alone or in conjunction with fMRI, also 
shows promise in both the differential diagnosis and prognosis of disorders 
of consciousness.82 Electrophysiological measures such as evoked potentials 
(EPs)83 and event-related potentials (ERPs)84 derived from 
electroencephalography (EEG) may have a role in detecting covert 
awareness in impaired patients.85 Using this technology to assess 
consciousness may have even wider application in clinical practice as EEGs 
have been used at the bedside for many years. 
Brain imaging studies during the past decade have challenged 
assumptions about the diagnostic categories of disorders of consciousness 
and their immutability.86 Although a number of studies utilizing these 
techniques have been performed over the past decade, only selected case 
reports will be described.87 
  
                                                 
 77  See Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of 
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 588 (2010) (asserting that neuroimaging is most 
helpful in those who exhibit no motor response evidencing awareness). 
 78  Positron emission tomography (PET) measures the metabolic activity in the 
brain after the patient has been administered radioactive elements. Fisher & Appelbaum, 
supra note 49, at 376.  
 79  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) records changes in blood 
oxygenation in the brain using magnetic fields. Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 376. 
 80  Jodie R. Gawryluk et al., Improving the Clinical Assessment of Consciousness 
With Advances in Electrophysiological and Neuroimaging Techniques, 10 BMC NEUROLOGY 
1, 3 (2010), available at http://biomedcentral.com/1471-2377/10/11. 
 81  Tshibanda et al., supra note 8, at 18. 
 82  Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 6. 
 83  Evoked potentials refer to basic sensory processing responses seen on EEG 
recordings. Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 3. 
 84  Event-related potentials are used to assess higher-level cognitive functions, 
such as memory or language. Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 3. 
 85  Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 1-2 (suggesting that electrophysiology 
addresses the need for better diagnosis of consciousness). 
 86  Fins et al., supra note 14, at 4. 
 87  For a summary of other studies, see Bruno et al., supra note 20, at 1381-82, 
Table 3. 
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A. Functional Neuroimaging to Detect Covert Awareness 
 
In 2006, Adrian Owen and colleagues published a provocative report 
that appeared to demonstrate the ability of a VS patient to respond to 
auditory commands.88 A twenty-three year old woman in a VS for five 
months was asked to imagine playing tennis and walking through her 
home.89 On fMRI, there was significant activation in the same areas of the 
brain observed in healthy volunteers asked to perform the same tasks.90 The 
authors concluded that the responses of the patient “confirmed beyond any 
doubt that she was aware of herself and her surroundings.”91 
An even more compelling fMRI study was reported in 2010 with 
fifty-four subjects, twenty-three who were in a VS and thirty-one in an 
MCS.92 The patients were evaluated on their performance of motor and 
spatial imagery tasks against healthy controls.93 The investigators found five 
subjects who were able to willfully modulate their brain activity in ways that 
closely matched the pattern of healthy controls, indicating preserved, but 
undetected, awareness.94  Of the five that exhibited such responses, four had 
been diagnosed in a VS for periods ranging from two months to five years.95 
After further clinical assessment, two of these patients were found to show 
some signs of functional response, indicating a diagnosis of MCS.96 Two 
patients, however, remained behaviorally in a VS.97 
One patient in this group, who had been in a VS for five years, also 
underwent a communication task using fMRI.98 He was asked specific yes or 
no questions and instructed to think of one type of imagery for yes and 
another for no.99 Remarkably, the patient responded accurately to five out of 
six autobiographical questions he was asked, such as “Is your father’s name 
Alexander?” (yes) and “Is your father’s name Thomas?” (no).100 The authors 
concluded that although it was impossible to establish any communication 
                                                 
 88  Adrian M. Owen, et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 
SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006). 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Martin M. Monti, et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of 
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010). 
 93  Id. at 580. 
 94  Id. at 585. 
 95  Id. at 583. 
 96  Id. at 585. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Martin M. Monti, et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of 
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED., at 580. 
 99  Id. at 585. 
 100  Id. 
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with the patient at the bedside, there was “clear evidence that the patient was 
aware and able to communicate. . . .”101  
A recent electrophysiological study concluded that a subset of VS 
patients may have the ability to “follow” movement commands.102 Using 
motor imagery, sixteen patients confirmed with a diagnosis of VS were 
instructed to imagine squeezing the right hand or wiggling the toes, 
alternating with relaxation.103 EEG responses were recorded during the 
tasks.104 Three of the sixteen patients (or nineteen percent) were repeatedly 
and reliably able to generate appropriate EEG responses.105 The investigators 
noted that even though these patients were not misdiagnosed as vegetative, 
experienced evaluators had not been able to identify the “actual condition” of 
these individuals using standard behavioral assessments.106 Of particular 
concern, however, is that only seventy-five percent of healthy controls could 
demonstrate motor awareness in the task, leading some experts to criticize 
the data as unreliable.107 
 
B. Functional Neuroimaging to Distinguish Disorders of Consciousness 
  
Functional neuroimaging of auditory processing has also been used 
to distinguish the VS from the MCS. In MCS patients subjected to complex 
auditory stimuli, brain imaging showed widespread activation upon the 
presentation of cries or the patient’s own name.108 Although MCS patients 
showed responses in auditory processing areas similar to healthy controls, no 
significant activation in higher order associative areas was found in VS 
patients.109 
Another group of MCS patients was scanned while recordings of 
either meaningful speech or backwards speech were played.110 The MCS 
subjects showed patterns of brain activity that were “remarkably similar” to 
                                                 
 101  Id. The patient later underwent extensive behavior testing and was found to 
exhibit some responses indicative of MCS rather than VS, but there was no way to determine 
how long such responses were apparent. Id.  
 102  Damian Cruse, et al., Bedside Detection of Awareness in the Vegetative State: 
A Cohort Study, 378 LANCET 2088, 2091 (2011).  
 103  Id. at 2089-90. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 2091. 
 106  Id. at 2092. 
 107  See, e.g., Andrew M. Goldfine et al., Correspondence, Bedside Detection of 
Awareness In the Vegetative State, 379 LANCET 1701, 1701 (2012) (stating that known 
alterations of brain function in VS and MCS patients along with the weak EEG signals in 
healthy controls raised concerns about the study’s findings). 
 108  Mélanie Boly et al., Cerebral Processing of Auditory and Noxious Stimuli in 
Severely Brain Injured Patients: Differences Between VS and MCS, 15 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL 
REHAB. 283, 286 (2005). 
 109  Id. 
 110  N.D. Schiff, et al., fMRI Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in Minimally 
Conscious Patients, 64 NEUROLOGY 514, 515–16 (2005). 
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those demonstrated by healthy controls,111 suggesting that language 
comprehension was preserved, at least to some degree, in these patients, 
distinguishing them from VS patients.112  
In a study utilizing PET scanning that compared VS and MCS 
patients, the authors found significant changes in brain function in the MCS 
patients during noxious stimulation.113 The higher-order areas of the brain 
associated with the pain matrix activated in MCS patients by unpleasant 
stimulation were substantially similar to the areas activated in healthy 
controls.114 In contrast, activation in those same areas was not seen in VS 
patients.115 The ability to perceive pain, therefore, is one more reason to 
distinguish most VS patients from those in an MCS. 
Electrophysiological approaches have also shown promise as a tool 
in determining diagnosis and prognosis in those with impaired 
consciousness.116 Such results may enable clinicians to predict future 
functional improvement at an earlier point in time rather than relying solely 
on behavioral assessments that can lead to a delayed diagnosis.117 For 
example, using auditory cognitive ERPs, covert signs of awareness were 
detected in a total LIS patient who appeared behaviorally comatose.118 The 
patient was presented names, including her own name, and asked to either 
count one target unfamiliar name or her own name.119 The patient’s 
responses to this auditory stimulus, recorded by EEG, indicated that the 
patient was able to consciously detect her own name.120 Fourteen days after 
testing was completed, the first signs of consciousness were behaviorally 
observed.121 The patient was transferred to a rehabilitation unit where she 
progressively improved.122 
 
C. Limitations of the Studies 
 
What can we infer about these patients? Does an individual whose 
scan shows islands of activity unequivocally possess a higher functioning 
brain? If the findings are negative, does that indicate a complete absence of 
consciousness? Before reaching such hasty conclusions, we need to 
                                                 
 111  Id. at 519. 
 112  Id. at 520. 
 113  Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1017. 
 114  Id. at 1018. 
 115  Id. This does not mean that VS patients may not experience pain; only that the 
technique failed to detect activation of areas of the brain associated with the conscious 
perception of pain. Id. at 1019.  
 116  See Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 6 (citing studies that demonstrated the 
usefulness of ERPs in LIS patients). 
 117  Id. 
 118  Schnakers et al., supra note 37, at 272. 
 119  Id. at 273. 
 120  Id. at 275–76. 
 121  Id. at 272. 
 122  Id. at 272. 
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acknowledge the limitations of functional neuroimaging and the realities of 
what it can accomplish. 
 
1. Research and Methodological Limitations 
 
Studies using sophisticated brain scans to detect covert awareness in 
patients in a VS, MCS, or LIS have been performed on a small number of 
patients in only a few research centers. Neuroimaging as an aid in diagnosis 
and prognosis is still in its infancy and it may be years before such research 
is translated into a clinical setting.123 Although EEGs are in routine use and 
are more transportable and cheaper than fMRI, ERPs to assess consciousness 
are also in the investigational stages.124Large, multi-center studies with 
standardized protocols will be necessary to validate the results of these 
studies.125  
There are also methodological limitations to fMRI. Analyzing 
neuroimaging data in patients with impaired consciousness is challenging.126 
Some brain lesions may interfere with the ability to follow commands even 
though the patient may have some cognitive ability.127 Using fMRI to detect 
evidence of consciousness requires prolonged attention.128 Since 
consciousness may be episodic or inconsistent in some patients, repeated 
testing may be necessary.129 Other drawbacks are technical, including the 
possibility of false positives or misinterpretation of scan results due to patient 
movement.130 Some patients have metal implants, making them inappropriate 
candidates for fMRI, although suitable for EEG studies.131 
 
2. Interpretation of Positive Findings  
 
Positive findings of brain activity in the VS patient indicate several 
possibilities: the patient has only automatic responses and no evidence of 
awareness, the patient has minimal consciousness, i.e., is in an MCS rather 
                                                 
 123  Fins et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Haibo Di et al., Neuroimaging Activation Studies In the Vegetative State: 
Predictors Of Recovery? 
8 CLINICAL. MED. 502, 506 (2008), available at http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/ 
papers/vs/ClinMed_VS_2008.pdf. 
 126  Monti et al., supra note 50, at 87 (noting the difficulty and complexity of 
acquiring and analyzing fMRI data in this population). 
 127  León-Carrión et al., supra note 69, at 565. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. (stating that patients may present only transient activity in response to 
instructions); see also Monti et al., supra note 50, at 88 (recommending that patients with a 
negative response be subjected to repeat testing at different times of the day or to testing with 
different modalities). 
 130  Laureys et al., supra note 7, at 544. 
 131  Cruse et al, supra note 102, at 2088. 
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than in a VS, or the patient is fully conscious and actually in complete LIS.132 
The researchers who report activity in the areas of the brain that process 
consciousness appear confident that the subjects possess subjective 
awareness of themselves and their environment.133 Others, however, caution 
that normal or near-normal activation in response to stimulation cannot be 
considered as proof of consciousness in these patients.134  
In particular, there is skepticism of brain imaging used to 
demonstrate command-following. The Owen and Monti studies assume that 
patients who demonstrate patterns of activity on scans when asked to 
imagine activities or follow commands through imagery have conscious 
awareness. Concerns have been raised that these studies are flawed and that 
their findings are not proof of the presence of awareness but may only reflect 
unconscious automatic reactions.135 Even healthy individuals, studies show, 
are capable of subconsciously processing sensory information without 
awareness.136 In addition, reports demonstrating speech recognition in MCS 
patients may be dissociative of actual consciousness.137 Such patients may be 
responding to stimuli but are not aware they are doing so. In other words, the 
“light’s on, but is anybody home?”138  
Further, the results may highlight only the misdiagnosis of disorders 
of consciousness. In other words, the studies may indicate that a few patients 
diagnosed in a VS may actually be in or emerging into an MCS state.139 
Nevertheless, this could implicate a sizable number of patients. Although 
                                                 
 132  D.J. Wilkinson et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Treatment from Vegetative Patients, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 508, 509 (2009), available 
at http://jme.bmj.com/content/35/8/508.full.pdf+html. 
 133  See supra text accompanying notes 91, 101, 106. 
 134  E.g., M. Boly et al., When Thoughts Become Action: An fMRI Paradigm to 
Study Volitional Brain Activity In Non-Communicative Brain Injured Patients, 36 
NEUROIMAGE 979, 980 (2007), available at 
http://www.wbic.cam.ac.uk/Members/cric/research/documents/boly-neuroimage-
2007.pdf/view (opining that the ability to respond to sensory stimulation is not proof of the 
presence of awareness).  
 135  See Daniel L. Greenberg, Comment on “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative 
State,” 315 SCIENCE 1221 (2007) (stating that Owen’s single case study suffered from 
“substantial flaws” and that it was not clear the tennis-imagining patient made any conscious 
decisions); see also Nachev Parashkev & Husain Masud, Comment on “Detecting Awareness 
in the Vegetative State,” 315 SCIENCE 1221 (2007) (arguing that Owen was making “radical 
inferences” in interpreting data); see also Tshibanda et al., supra note 8 at 19–20 (stating that 
the only thing that can be inferred from fMRI studies is that some patients can process sensory 
stimuli).   
 136  See Neil Levy, Going Beyond the Evidence, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19, 20 (2009) 
(noting that even normal persons engage in mental tasks that are not conscious). 
 137  See Farah, supra note 48, at 18 (asserting that brain damage leads to 
dissociation between cognition and awareness).  
 138  Robert Burton, The Light’s On, But Is Anybody Home, SALON (Sept. 25, 2007), 
available at http://www.salon.com/2007/09/25/is_she_conscious/; see also Fisher & 
Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 381 (stating that it may not be reasonable to assume that activity 
in a brain region is associated with cognitive functioning).  
 139  Tshibanda et al., supra note 8, at 21. 
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estimates vary widely, there may be more than 35,000 adult VS patients in 
the United States140 and even more in MCS.141  
Moreover, the studies should not be exaggerated to suggest that all 
VS patients retain some semblance of consciousness. Only a small 
proportion of VS patients, most of whom suffered a traumatic insult, have 
demonstrated covert awareness. Those who suffered a nontraumatic (anoxic) 
injury or who have been in a VS for more than one year are less likely to 
have the potential for normal brain activation on neuroimaging.142  
Further research may validate these early findings but, for now, it 
may be premature to conclude that activation in some areas of the brain, 
when given imagery or auditory tasks, definitively equates with 
consciousness.143 Although the research is promising, the results are not yet 
reliable enough for widespread use in clinical practice.   
 
3. Interpretation of Negative Findings  
 
Negative findings, or the absence of brain activation, in severely 
brain-injured patients also need to be approached cautiously. From the 
studies conducted so far, it is not possible to conclude emphatically that 
negative findings reflect the absence of cognition.144 Some patients may have 
been transiently unconscious or asleep during testing or the tasks may have 
been too complex due to deficits in language comprehension, memory, or 
decision making.145 The choice of experiment is also crucial to understanding 
the results. For example, if a patient has abnormal auditory pathways, the use 
of auditory stimuli to provoke a response is inappropriate.146 Methodological 
limitations, discussed previously, may also limit the usefulness of negative 
findings.147 Most important, studies have demonstrated false negatives even 
                                                 
 140  See Fins et al, supra note 14, at 4 (citing to a study estimating a prevalence of 
VS adults in the United States between 40 and 168 per million population). 
 141  Id.   
 142  Adrian M. Owen et al., Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to 
Detect Covert Awareness in the Vegetative State, 64 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1098, 1101 
(2007). 
 143  See Levy, supra note 136, at 20 (questioning whether the patient in Owen’s 
2006 study was misdiagnosed as VS instead of MCS—if anything, the task was so complex 
that if the study provided evidence of consciousness, the response was indicative of full-blown 
consciousness). 
 144  See Owen, supra note 88, at 1402 (emphasizing that negative findings cannot 
be used as evidence of a lack of awareness). 
 145  Monti et al., supra note 92, at 588; see also Owen et al., supra note 142, at 
1101 (noting that patients may be asleep or may not have understood or heard the commands, 
leading to false negative results). 
 146  Laureys, supra note 7, at 544. 
 147  See supra Part II.C.1. 
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in healthy volunteers.148 Thus, “negative findings should never be taken as 
evidence for a lack of mental activity.”149 
 
 
IV.  LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
  
The prospect of a subset of VS patients with undetected 
consciousness raises legal and ethical ramifications for end-of-life decision 
making.  Does having covert signs of awareness give a patient greater legal 
or moral status such that it is inappropriate to remove life-sustaining 
treatments, such as artificial nutrition and hydration?150 Or, is the ability to 
perceive suffering without the ability to express it a life not worth living?  
 
A. Effect on the Legal System 
 
Both legislatures and courts have been influenced by a view of the 
VS as an irreversible, meaningless existence. As a result of the emerging 
consensus after Quinlan that incompetent vegetative patients had a right to 
forego life-sustaining care, all states enacted advance directive statutes.151 
Under these laws, patients, while competent, may execute a directive setting 
out their wishes regarding end-of-life care; they may also designate a health 
care agent to make decisions for them when they lack decision-making 
capacity.152 In the absence of an advance directive, family members or other 
surrogates are instructed to make decisions based on the patient’s preferences 
expressed while the patient was competent, a doctrine known as substituted 
judgment.153 In some states, if the patient’s wishes cannot be discerned, a 
decision about life-sustaining treatments may be made under a best-interest 
standard.154 Most states allow surrogates and health care providers to make 
end-of-life decisions in the clinical setting, but a few require court approval 
in the absence of an advance directive.155 
                                                 
 148  Monti, supra note 50, at 87; see also Cruse, supra note 102, at 2093 (noting 
that three healthy volunteers could not produce significant EEG responses). 
 149  Monti, supra note 50, at 88.  
 150  See id. at 383; see also Barbara A. Wilson et al., Neuropsychological 
Assessment and Management of People in States of Impaired Consciousness: An Overview of 
Some Recent Studies, 9 BRAIN IMPAIRMENT 28, 29 (describing a case where a women was 
found to be misdiagnosed in VS while undergoing assessment to determine if feeding and 
hydration should be withdrawn. In a follow-up ten years later, she was living in the 
community with constant support, but able to speak, initiate conversation, use an electric 
wheelchair, drink through straw, and eat food). 
 151  ALAN MEISEL & KATHERINE L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF 
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 7.10 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005-2012). 
 152  Id.  
 153  Id. at § 4.02 (discussing the substituted judgment standard). 
 154  Id. at § 4.07 (explaining the best interests standard). 
 155  Id. at § 3.03 (addressing the different settings in which end-of-life decisions are 
made). 
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Many advance directive statutes limit the class of persons from 
whom life-sustaining care may be withheld or withdrawn to those in a 
terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness, i.e., a permanent vegetative 
state.156 For example, in Pennsylvania, a surrogate may authorize the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures only from an incompetent patient 
who has an end-stage disease or is “permanently unconscious.”157 
Permanently unconscious is defined as:  
 
A medical condition that has been diagnosed in accordance 
with currently accepted medical standards and with 
reasonable medical certainty as total and irreversible loss of 
consciousness and capacity for interaction with the 
environment. The term includes, without limitation, an 
irreversible vegetative state or irreversible coma.158 
 
Florida allows withdrawal or withholding of treatment by a surrogate 
when the patient is diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state, which is 
defined as “a permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in 
which there is [an] absence of voluntary action or cognitive behavior [and] 
an inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the 
environment.”159  Although advance directive statutes do not supplant 
common law rights, they may constrain the right of patients and surrogates to 
forgo life-sustaining care in disorders of consciousness other than an 
irreversible coma or permanent vegetative state.160 
 Many courts, beginning with Quinlan, have also approached VS 
patients differently than other impaired individuals when confronted with 
requests to end life support. Judicial opinions largely reflect the clinical 
assumption that VS involves a “special category of patients.”161 In 
authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care, most 
courts would probably agree that VS is a condition where “(p)ersonality, 
memory, purposive action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even 
emotional states are gone.”162 Thus, the VS has become an important 
diagnostic predicate on which to base legal decisions allowing caretakers or 
surrogates to forego life-sustaining care. 
                                                 
 156  Id. at §§ 7.06 [A], 8.03. 
 157  20 PA. CONS. STAT.  ANN. §§ 5456, 5461, 5462 (2005). 
 158  20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5422 (2005). 
 159  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(12) (West 2010). 
 160  Some advance directive statutes allow withdrawal of care from patients in an 
end-stage condition, which includes advanced Alzheimer’s disease. Meisel & Cerminara, 
supra note 151, at § 7.06 [A] [2]. 
 161  In re Conroy, 486 A.2d. 1209, 1228 (N.J. 1985). 
 162  In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174-75 (1983)). 
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On the other hand, courts have been careful to distinguish the VS 
patient from the MCS patient, who has been conferred greater moral and 
legal status.163 Several cases illustrate the tendency of courts to require 
heightened procedural protections before life-sustaining care can be 
withdrawn from non-VS patients. In In re Martin, the patient was described 
as having minimal voluntary movements and consciousness to some extent, 
but unable to communicate in any meaningful way.164 The patient’s wife 
sought a court order to terminate all medical treatment, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration, which was opposed by the patient’s mother and 
sister.165 The court considered, but rejected, a best interests (objective) 
standard for terminating treatment in favor of a subjective or substituted 
judgment standard.166 Indicating, however, that the objective standard might 
be appropriate for a VS patient, the court stated: “In the cases that have 
applied a more objective test or suggested a more objective test would be 
proper, the patient generally has been comatose or in a persistent vegetative 
state.”167 The court did not explain, however, why there should be a 
distinction between vegetative and minimally conscious patients when 
choosing the appropriate test to apply in terminating life support. 
Similarly, in Conservatorship of Wendland, the spouse conservator 
sought to withdraw tube feedings from her husband who was in MCS.168 
Because the patient was intermittently conscious, the conservator was 
required to present clear and convincing evidence of his wishes to refuse life-
sustaining treatment or that it was in his best interests to end his life, a 
burden that could not be met in this case.169 The court was careful to 
distinguish the right of surrogates to withdraw treatment from a person in an 
MCS from one in a VS. The high evidentiary standard of clear and 
convincing evidence would not be required for “permanently unconscious 
patients, including those who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative 
state.”170  
More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to consider whether a guardian could exercise the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on behalf of a profoundly retarded, never-competent 
                                                 
 163  It is questionable whether there should be sharp distinctions drawn between VS 
and MCS patients in end-of-life care. See Lawrence J. Nelson and Ronald E. Cranford, 
Michael Martin and Robert Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 427, 446–47 (1999) (arguing that there are no valid legal or clinical reasons to 
treat MCS patients differently than VS patients). 
 164  In re Martin, 538 N.W. 2d 399, 402-03 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v. 
Martin, 516 U.S. 1113 (1996). 
 165  Id. at 402. 
 166  Id. at 408-09. 
 167  Id. at 408. 
 168  In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151,155 (Cal. 2001). 
 169  Id. at 166. 
 170  Id. at 175; see also In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67–68 (Wis. 1992) (refusing to 
require clear and convincing proof of the wishes of an individual in VS). 
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patient.171 The court concluded that, unless authorized by an advance 
directive, life-preserving care must be provided to an individual who has 
neither an end-stage medical condition nor is permanently unconscious.172   
Case law and advance directive statutes reflect a broad societal view 
that patients in a VS or in a state of permanent unconsciousness are 
presumed to be in the category of persons for whom life-sustaining 
procedures can be ethically withheld or withdrawn. Patients in a VS have 
been not only clinically but also legally marginalized; they are among the 
“almost dead.”173 But the emerging neuroscience indicates there may be 
more blurring of the line between conscious and unconscious than previously 
thought.174 If functional imaging to detect hidden awareness gains 
widespread clinical acceptance, the evolving neuroscience may have a far-
reaching effect on how legal bodies define consciousness and approach end-
of-life decisions for this vulnerable population.175 If nothing else, the new 
data on undetected consciousness should alert legislators and courts to 
reconsider or question the inviolability of the VS diagnosis. Accurate 
diagnosis of these patients is critical, as, under existing law, patients who 
demonstrate some level of consciousness may move “from the ‘possibly 
allowed to die’ category to the ‘not generally allowed to die’ category.”176  
 
B. Effect on End-of-Life Decisions By Surrogates and Healthcare 
Providers 
  
Advances in neuroimaging have the potential to alter end-of-life 
conversations between patients, their families, and their caretakers. Even if a 
patient has an advance directive, such as a living will, it is unlikely the 
patient will have considered the possibility that consciousness may exist on a 
                                                 
 171  In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 506 (Pa. 2010), aff’g on other grounds 967 A.2d 971 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
 172  Id. at 515; see also Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Ky. 2004) 
(construing state statute to allow the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care only in 
patients who are permanently unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state, or who are 
expected to die within a few days); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W. 2d 485, 491–92 (Wis. 1997), 
cert. denied sub nom. Spahn v. Wittman, 522 U.S. 951 (1997) (refusing to allow guardian to 
withdraw care from a patient who was not in a persistent vegetative state). 
 173  Some have argued that brain death should include those in VS because they 
lack the consciousness required for a person to be considered living. See, e.g., Robert M. 
Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True By Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10, 10-11 (2003). 
 174  Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 377. For a helpful summary of 
definitions of unconsciousness used in state statutes, see id. at 383, Table 1. 
 175  See id. at 382 (arguing that statutory language used to define neurological 
conditions and behaviors should be updated in light of neuroscientific advances). 
 176  David Cyranoski, Neuroscience: The Mind Reader, 486 NATURE 178, 180 
(2012), available at http://www.nature.com/news/neuroscience-the-mind-reader-1.10816; see 
also, e.g., In re Riley M, No. A-96-409, 1997 WL 133169, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. March 25, 
1997). In Riley, the court approved a DNR (“do not resuscitate) order for a two-year old in a 
persistent vegetative state. While an appeal was pending, the diagnosis was changed because 
of “marked changes” in the child’s condition making the DNR order inappropriate. 
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continuum. In most cases, therefore, families and other surrogates will be 
called on to choose whether life-supporting care should be terminated. The 
emerging science will heighten expectations for some family members, and 
perhaps even exaggerate those expectations. For others, the lack of objective 
signs of awareness on brain imaging will be intensely disappointing. 
Families are often faced with end-of-life options days or weeks after 
a serious brain injury. At that point, however, it is impossible to predict with 
any confidence whether the patient will evolve to MCS or a functional 
recovery.177 Later on, when the diagnosis is clear, decisions to end a family 
member’s life become more difficult as the patient may be breathing on his 
own and the choice is often whether to remove a feeding tube. Reliable 
diagnoses and prognoses are, therefore, profoundly important as families or 
other caretakers consider whether to forego end-of-life procedures. Ethical 
responsibilities require that families be provided with the full range of 
choices available in determining whether to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. “They are entitled to support and the exchange of 
information that is both scientifically accurate and compassionately 
communicated.”178  
 If neuroimaging lives up to its potential, it could be a valuable aid in 
assessing early signs of consciousness in patients who are aware but cannot 
demonstrate any motor behavior reflecting an ability to understand 
commands or communicate.179 For example, studies indicating that MCS 
patients have the ability to process language and speech, which one 
prominent neurologist has called “spine-chilling,”180 are significant because 
these patients have often been conflated with those in a VS and shunted off 
to chronic care facilities without benefit of meaningful treatment and 
rehabilitation.181  
Families may also be provided with better prognostic information.182 
If the developing science can be adapted for bedside use, it may help to 
identify those patients who will emerge from a VS and respond to 
rehabilitation intended to improve their mental state. Several studies have 
shown that those few patients who exhibit signs of consciousness on imaging 
are more likely later to exhibit behavioral signs of awareness.183 For 
example, one study demonstrated that the higher the level of speech 
                                                 
 177  See generally BERNAT, supra note 4, at 296–298 (discussing the limits of 
prognostication in the VS and MCS states). 
 178  Fins et al., supra note 14, at 9. 
 179  See Tshabanda et al., supra note 8, at 20 (concluding that the new imaging 
studies may be used to detect signs of consciousness that cannot be discerned in a 
conventional assessment). 
 180  Fins, supra note 62, at 341. 
 181  Id. at 342. 
 182  Tshabanda et al, supra note 8, at 21 (suggesting that fMRI could be a marker of 
prognosis). 
 183  See Di et al., supra note 125, at 506 (reviewing fifteen studies and concluding 
that early activation of brain activity is a reliable marker of recovery). 
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processing demonstrated by VS patients on fMRI, the more likely they were 
to show improvement in their behavioral assessment six months later, often 
leading to a changed diagnosis.184  
Functional neuroimaging may also aid in assessing the effect of 
treatment (as yet experimental) in those with impaired consciousness.185 
There have been reports that certain drugs, such as amantadine or zolpidem 
(Ambien), may temporarily improve awareness in VS and MCS patients.186 
Not all patients respond to these drugs, however, and neuroimaging may 
prove to be useful in selecting appropriate patients for these therapies. 
Early diagnosis of patients with some level of consciousness is 
particularly important for proper pain management.187 A correct diagnosis 
may also guide clinicians to determine when pain relief should be provided 
for patients in whom life-sustaining procedures patients are withdrawn.188 
Some authors have raised the possibility of using functional neuroimaging to 
ask patients if they are feeling pain.189 Even if such communication cannot 
be established, the possibility of covert awareness in a minority of patients 
and the high rate of diagnostic error suggest that all patients with impaired 
consciousness, even those in an apparent VS, should receive pain 
medication.190  
More worrisome, if neuroscience progresses to the point where 
clinicians using sophisticated brain imaging can communicate with a patient 
who is unresponsive behaviorally, the next stage may be asking the patient 
whether life-sustaining treatment should be continued or withdrawn.191 This 
would be a precarious step. The doctrine of informed consent requires 
patients to be competent to make health care decisions. Competency 
encompasses not only the ability to communicate a choice, but also the 
                                                 
 184  M. R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging to Aid the 
Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 2550 (2009) (reporting 
that all but one out of eight VS patients who demonstrated a high level of auditory processing 
during fMRI showed behavioral evidence of emergence to MCS six months later).  
 185  Di et al., supra note 125, at 506.  
 186  See, e.g., Caroline Schnakers et al., Measuring The Effect Of Amantadine In 
Chronic Anoxic Minimally Conscious State, 79 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 
225, 226 (2008) (demonstrating the beneficial effect of amantadine in a single patient); see 
also, e.g., Ralf Class & Wally Nel, Drug Induced Arousal From the Permanent Vegetative 
State, 21 NEUROREHABILITATION 23, 24–25 (2006) (reporting arousal in three patients in a 
permanent vegetative state with zolpidem). 
 187  See Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 506 (stressing the importance of early 
diagnosis and pain management in LIS patients). 
 188  Fins et al., supra note 14, at 6 (suggesting that neuroimaging could be helpful 
in assessing pain in individuals who have lost the ability to communicate). 
 189  Monti et al., supra note 92, at 589. 
 190  See Caroline Schnakers & Nathan D. Zasler, Pain Assessment and 
Management in Disorders of Consciousness, 20 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROLOGY 620, 624 
(2007) (suggesting that all patients in VS or MCS receive analgesics).  
 191  See Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 380 (envisioning using 
neuroimaging methods to ask a patient if he wants to be removed from life support). 
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ability to understand relevant information and to appreciate treatment 
alternatives and their consequences.192   
Brain scans alone cannot demonstrate competency and the cognitive 
and emotional abilities to make such a complex decision may be out of reach 
of these patients. Making an autonomous choice requires not only 
comprehension but also the ability to judge the worth of treatment in 
accordance with one’s own values and personal conscience. It is only 
speculation whether patients who can minimally communicate via 
neuroimaging possess that kind of sophisticated reasoning ability. 
There are also risks in accepting technology as the final word in 
assessing consciousness. Some families will almost surely request fMRI or 
electrophysiological studies to confirm or challenge the VS diagnosis. 
Assuming a dispute among family members or refusal by the attending 
physician to order functional imaging, it is conceivable that there could be 
court proceedings initiated to compel such testing. Indeed, that request was 
made in the Schiavo case, where the parents retained experts who testified 
that Schiavo was in an MCS rather than a VS.193 The court had before it CT 
scans of the brain that demonstrated structural defects, but refused to order 
an fMRI, which the parents hoped would demonstrate evidence of conscious 
activity.194   
In 2005, at the time of the Schiavo case, and even today, fMRI 
suggestions of consciousness in an otherwise behaviorally unresponsive 
patient are not ready for the spotlight of the courtroom. It is unlikely that this 
emerging technology would meet the standards for scientific reliability 
established in federal and state courts under Daubert195 and its progeny.196 If 
the studies are validated in larger clinical populations, however, they can be 
expected to provoke courtroom controversies over diagnosis in end-of-life 
care. 
Outside the realm of family disputes, there may be overreliance on 
the diagnostic use of advanced neuroimaging techniques. The means to 
determine whether conscious functions of the brain have irreversibly ceased 
have largely been behavioral observations, which as previously noted, can be 
challenging.197 Technical “answers” to whether a patient has undetected 
consciousness may be tantalizingly persuasive to family members and 
clinicians, even if the science is still elusive. In a recent case pending in 
British Columbia, the parents of a man diagnosed in VS have asked the court 
                                                 
 192  See Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence; Formulating 
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS. L. REV. 345, 351 
(discussing Appelbaum and Grisso’s competence standards). 
 193  Order at 4-6, In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Pinellas Cnty. Ct. 
March 9, 2005), available at http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/trialctorder030905.pdf. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 196  See Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 381-82 (discussing the 
admissibility of neuroimaging data). 
 197  See supra Part II.C. 
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to keep their son alive so that he can participate in one of Owen’s studies to 
assess covert consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients.198 The well-
known “CSI effect” informs us that lay people have high expectations for 
scientific, objective evidence, including fMRI.199 The presence or hope of 
conscious activity on brain scans or EEGs may lead not only families, but 
also health care providers, down the path of overreliance on neuroimaging 
technology, without consideration of its limitations and experimental 
posture. False hope for the families of those with severe brain injuries like 
VS may be worse than no hope at all. 
 On the other hand, if brain scans can reliably rule out conscious 
thoughts or perceptions, does that render the withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining procedures even more ethically justifiable? The absence of 
any conscious activity on neuroimaging may give voice to the notion that 
further treatment is medically “futile.” The debate about end-of-life care has 
gradually shifted from the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment the patient 
or surrogate deems futile to the obligation to provide care the physician 
deems futile.200 These reverse end-of-life cases raise questions about whether 
the surrogate of an incompetent VS patient has the right to demand life-
preserving care over the health care provider’s objections.201 If functional 
neuroimaging tests repeatedly demonstrate a complete lack of brain activity 
diagnostic of awareness, the findings may give health care providers further 
persuasive tools to contend that life-prolonging care is futile.   
The concept of futility also raises broader issues concerning the just 
allocation of healthcare resources. Some commentators argue that society 
should not use finite resources to keep alive those who are in a VS and 
unable to meaningfully interact with their environment, caretakers, and 
family.202 Veatch and Spicer propose that if there is community consensus, 
reimbursement for life-sustaining care of those in a persistent vegetative state 
                                                 
 198  Ian Mulgrew, Family Fights Over of Severely Brain Injured Man, VANCOUVER 
SUN, Dec. 5, 2012, available at  http://www.vancouversun.com/health/ 
Family+fights+over+fate+severely+brain+injured/7653097/story.html#ixzz2EC1HfuPR. 
 199 See David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on 
Juror-Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 574 (reporting that fMRI evidence 
indicating the defendant is lying may be more persuasive to potential jurors than other 
evidence of lying). 
 200  See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe 
Harbor To Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2007). 
 201  Id.  
 202  See, e.g., Jacob M. Appel, Rational Rationing vs. Irrational Rationing: The 
Struggle for the Legacy of Reuben Bentancourt, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appel/rational-rationing-vs-irr_b_622057.html 
(arguing that VS patients should be viewed differently than other patients and that scarce 
resources should not be committed to prolonging their lives); see also Catherine Constable, 
Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative 
State: Changing Tack, 26 BIOETHICS 157, 162 (2012) (arguing there should be a presumption 
to withdraw life-sustaining in VS patients, in part because resources should be allocated to 
those who can benefit from them).  
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should end at three months of care.203 Batavia argues that a rationing scheme 
based on medical futility should focus on the permanently unconscious, 
defined as a lack of consciousness for one year.204 In today’s cost-conscious 
heath care environment, it is possible to envision a rationing agenda that 
relies on adjuvant neuroimaging to “rule out” consciousness in an effort to 
justify an end of funding for life-prolonging care. 
Finally, the presence of sensory or cognitive processing in the lives 
of seriously brain-damaged individuals raises larger philosophical questions 
about the impact this small subset of VS patients with covert consciousness 
will have on end-of-life decisions. Is the ability to follow simple commands 
indicative of a “meaningful” life? Can families or other surrogates discern 
whether the patient would have wanted to opt for any life, or object to the 
“prison” of MCS?205  In fact, given the likelihood that patients with minimal 
or intermittent awareness experience pain, it may be worse to be partially 
conscious. Further, there is no assurance, even with aggressive care, that a 
person in a VS who demonstrates minimal awareness will ever be able to 
achieve a recovery beyond a severe disability.206 What good is knowing an 
individual has islands of brain activity if there is little or no possibility he 
will emerge from that state to be able to interact with his caretakers or 
family? Indeed, some might conclude that a state of partially preserved 
cognition without a means of expression is a “life worse than death.”207 A 
better understanding of consciousness will inform this debate.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Functional neuroimaging needs to be cautiously interpreted, but may 
open a window into how much awareness is possible in a person in a 
vegetative or minimally conscious state. The data are preliminary and 
families need transparency about the limits of diagnosing or prognosticating 
on the basis of brain scans alone. At the very least, patients and their families 
should be informed of the shortcomings of the neuroscience and that case 
reports of awareness in a very small proportion of VS and MCS patients are 
investigational and unlikely to predict whether a particular individual will 
benefit from high-tech neuroimaging tools. Inevitably, as the technology 
advances, the ability to assess cognitive awareness will improve, leading to 
                                                 
 203  Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of 
the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 15, 30 (1992). 
 204  Andrew I. Batavia, Disability Versus Futility in Rational Health Care Services: 
Defining Medical Futility Based on Permanent Unconsciousness—PVS, Coma and 
Anencephaly, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 219, 229 (2002).  
 205  Robert T. Knight, Consciousness Unchained: Ethical Issues and the Vegetative 
State and Minimally Conscious State, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2008). 
 206  See Wilkinson et al., supra note 132 at 509 (stating there are no reports of VS 
patients identified as conscious on neuroimaging who made a recovery to functional 
independence). 
 207  Id. at 510. 
25
Harrington: Advances in Neuroimaging
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
238 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
 
better diagnoses and outcomes in those with disorders of consciousness. This 
should help patients, families, physicians, and the courts, when necessary, to 
make better end-of-life decisions. 
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